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DEPOSITS OF DEMAND PAPER AS "PURCHASES" 
RoscoE B. TURNER 
Bank clearings have long been regarded as one of the most 
valuable indices of the volume of commercial transactions had 
during a given period.1 Implicit in this is recognition of the fact 
that payments, where more than a few dollars are involved, are 
today almost universally made by check. It is, of course, recog- 
nized, however, that such statistics contain an element of unre- 
liability in that an increase in amount may be accounted for, at 
least in part, by a greater use of bank deposits, as well as by 
reason of a greater amount of business done. The movement to 
popularize the "trade acceptance" 2 as an instrument to displace 
the open book account has no doubt contributed to the increase 
in volume of bank clearings, but without occasioning a corre- 
sponding increase in commercial transactions. Possibly it might 
also be shown that a greater number of time or demand notes 
have been drawn payable at banks than heretofore, and, like the 
trade acceptance so payable, have contributed to the aggregate 
of bank clearings. But whatever their utility to reflect an in- 
crease in the volume of business, clearing statistics testify con- 
vincingly that bank deposits and the instruments used to avail 
of deposits are elements of increasing significance in the finan- 
cial scheme of things.3 
The development in the use of checks is illustrative. Not so 
many years ago it was customary for the southern or western 
merchant, in making payments to his eastern wholesaler, to re- 
mit by bank draft, the merchant paying the exchange costs upon 
purchasing the draft. Checks circulated for the most part only 
in the immediate vicinity of the depositor. Following the estab- 
lishment of the national banking system during the Civil War, 
bringing as it did some measure of stability to banking through- 
out the country, the widespread use of checks developed.4 It is 
1 Edwin Frickey, Bank Clearings Outside New York City, 1875-1914 
(1925) 7 REV. OF ECON. STATISTICS 252. The data now principally relied 
upon is the debit to the individual depositor's account as being more accurate 
in the main than clearing figures. This material since 1918 has been col- 
lected by the Federal Reserve Board. For an excellent comparison of the 
two, see SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS (1St ed. 1926) 
c. 12. 
2 WESTERFIELD, BANKING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1st ed. 1924) 641. 
3 See SPAHR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 490 for a table showing the increase 
in volume of bank debits since 1919. 
4 MOULTON, MONEY AND BANKING (1st ed. 1916) Part II, 37. 
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now customary to use the personal check in making payments 
anywhere in the country, the costs of collection, if any, normally 
being borne by the creditor. Indeed the American dollar check 
has within the last few years been found even in international 
transactions, where heretofore the foreign currency banker's 
draft was used almost exclusively. 
The issuance of these various instruments constituting draw- 
ings upon bank deposits is only one phase of the matter. Of 
perhaps equal importance is the use to which such paper is put 
while outstanding. If it is indorsed restrictively and merely 
handed to an agent for collection, although it would, of course, 
figure in clearing house statistics, it is of relatively little further 
service. If indorsed generally and deposited by the holder, the 
sum being immediately carried to the depositor's account avail- 
able for drawing, it is evident there are two deposits where only 
one existed before; the one against which the item was drawn 
and the one in the holder's favor upon depositing the check. 
And if the bank on its part uses the item to build up its balances 
with a correspondent, a further addition to the sum total of de- 
posit currency available in the country at the moment has been 
made. It is quite possible that before the original item is paid 
both the original holder and his bank may have drawn against 
the deposits in their favor, the items in each case serving as the 
basis for other drawings. 
Thus there is built up a credit structure of considerable pro- 
portions which, however, is dependant for its fullest development 
upon the concurrence of a number of factors. Many of these, 
an elastic currency responsive to fluctuating seasonal demands, 
the mobilization of bank reserves, an improved collection system, 
and others contributing to stable banking, have in large measure 
been supplied by the Federal Reserve system.5 It is evident, 
though, that conflicting and unsatisfactory decisions relating to 
any of the various steps between issuance and ultimate collection 
serve to cause trouble. Therefore, it is disquieting that many 
of the most ordinary legal incidents of deposits of demand or 
matured paper are still a subject of considerable litigation. It 
would no doubt be much more disturbing if legal rules pertaining 
to such deposits had crystalized in the seventeenth century with 
the inception of banking among the goldsmiths of Lombardy 
Street.6 Possibly something of this very sort has in fact taken 
place. 
The course of judicial legislation as exemplified in some of the 
leading decisions since the Civil War is enlightening. In the 
most recent, that of Equitable Trust Company v. Rochling7 the 
5 For example see KNIFFEN, COMMERCIAL BANKING (1st ed. 1923) c. 6. 
6 MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10. 
748 Sup. Ct. 58 (1927). 
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Supreme Court had under consideration several similar deposits 8 
made with the firm of Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne, private New 
York bankers, just prior to their failure. It appears that in one 
of these transactions Gebrueder Rochling, bankers of Frankfort- 
on-Main, who maintained an account with Knauth, Nachod & 
Kuhne, procured the National Bank of Commerce of New York 
to deposit $30,000 to the credit of this account. The National 
Bank of Commerce made the deposit by delivering its cashier's 
check for the amount payable to Knauth, Nachod and Kuhne 
"for account of Rochling Bank, Gebr. Frankfort-on-Main." 
Upon receipt of the item Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne credited Ge- 
brueder Rochling and deposited the item in its own account with 
another New York bank. The failure occurred before the check 
had been cleared. Upon this state of facts Gebrueder Rochling 
claimed to be entitled to reclamation of the proceeds of the check, 
but the court, by Justice Stone, disallowed the claim. 
From the standpoint of abstract legal theory the case was 
regarded as requiring a decision of whether Knauth, Nachod & 
Kuhne should be considered to have received the deposit as 
"agents" or as "purchasers." The lower court had held, follow- 
ing a supposed analogy to indorsements "for account of," 
9 that 
a trust or agency relation was created, and so allowed a pre- 
ferred claim. This position was disposed of with eminent good 
sense by the court, the words "for account of" being given their 
ordinary business significance, that is, as being merely an advice 
as to the account to which credit should be given; written on the 
face of the instrument for purposes of convenience.10 With the 
8 The term deposit is used herein in its most general sense and not as 
a term denoting any particular legal consequences-as, for example, would 
the term bailment. 
9 In this connection the Supreme Court said: "It may be conceded that 
such an indorsement indicates that the transaction is not a purchase and 
sale of the paper, and, at least when not otherwise explained or limited, 
may fairly be taken to mean that the interest gained by the indorsee is 
that of an agent for collection." In other words had the National Bank 
of Commerce made its check payable to self and then indorsed it "for ac- 
count of Rochling Bank, Gebr. Frankfort-on-Main" the court would prob- 
ably have sustained the lower court in giving judgment for the plaintiff. 
It may well be doubted that this would be because a different result was 
intended by the depositing bank. Although the problem of restrictive in- 
dorsements is beyond the scope of this paper, it is believed the court need 
not have conceded that the "for account of" indorsement negatives any 
idea of sale, as is the result if the "for collection" indorsement is used. 
Commercial Bank of Penn. v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533 
(1893). However, under the Negotiable Instruments Law, the "for ac- 
count of" indorsement has been held restrictive, Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. 
v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (1919). 
o1 The advantage of writing the advice on the instrument is plain in that 
otherwise a separate writing must be used and for purposes of keeping a 
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matter of giving any peculiar significance to these words out of 
the question, the court had no hesitation in treating the check 
as equivalent to a cash deposit, as indeed the custom between the 
banks involved was shown to be; cashier's checks being regarded 
practically as cash. The result then comes within precedent 
established long ago that depositors of money are not entitled 
to preferred treatment over other types of creditors.1 
In the Latzko case,12 decided at the same time as the Rochling 
case, the check deposited was not a cashier's check, but one 
drawn on a third bank. This was regarded as a distinction with- 
out difference, the controlling feature again being said to be that 
credit was given on receipt of the item. It also did not appear 
that the account would bear interest from date of credit, as was 
the situation in the Rochling case. Although in this case also 
there was no evidence that the account was subject to immediate 
drawing, the court stated that this would be assumed. Thus 
this litigation stresses the matter of giving credit in the drawing 
account as being the dominant fact going to show "purchase" 
rather than "agency," at least where the issue is whether or not 
a preferred claim should be allowed. Of chief interest at the 
moment, however, is the citation of authority relied upon by the 
court. 
Two prior Supreme Court cases were cited. Of these, that of 
City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank,l3 in which the opinion 
was also written by Justice Stone, involved a question as to 
whether a depositor might recover of a correspondent bank, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, for alleged negligence in send- 
ing the deposited item directly to the drawee for payment. The 
item, a check drawn December 22, 1920, by the County of Co- 
chise, Arizona, in favor of the plaintiff, the City of Douglas, was 
delivered, indorsed in blank, to the First National Bank of Doug- 
las, Arizona, and credited to the plaintiff's account, the amount 
also being entered in the passbook. The feature of the case new 
to the Supreme Court was the passbook provision: "All out-of- 
town items credited, subject to final payment." In the lower 
court 14 it was ruled that an "agency" relation was created, and, 
following the New York collection rule, it was determined that 
the depositor had no cause of action against the sub-agent cor- 
respondent bank. The case was taken to the Supreme Court on 
the theory that, granting that an agency relationship was estab- 
record of the transaction it is simpler to have the entire story told by the 
item itself. 
11 In the matter of the Franklin Bank, 1 Paige 249 (N. Y. 1828). 
12 Latzko v. Equitable Trust Co., 48 Sup. Ct. 60 (1927). 
13 271 U. S. 489, 46 Sup. Ct. 554 (1926). 
14 City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 300 Fed. 573, 575 (D. 
Texas, 1924). See also (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL 323. 
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lished, still the effect of the clause was to adopt the Massachu- 
setts rule so that the Federal Reserve Bank as agent of the de- 
positor could be held directly responsible. The Supreme Court 
decision for the defendant was given on grounds not discussed 
by the lower court, Justice Stone saying: 
". . . when paper is indorsed without restriction by a 
depositor, and is at once passed to his credit by the bank to which 
he delivers it, he becomes the creditor of the bank; the bank be- 
comes owner of the paper, and in making the collection is not 
the agent for the depositor." 
It is interesting to note that in reaching this result the court 
cited no case which had had before it the precise question in- 
volved in the Douglas case, although several cases were cited 
which for other purposes had ruled that the bank of deposit 
should be regarded as a "purchaser." The court apparently 
rested the case principally on the authority of Burton v. United 
States,15 which was cited several times. Here the question before 
the court was whether an indictment of Senator Burton charg- 
ing him with having received payment in St. Louis for services 
rendered before the United States Post Office Department could 
be sustained upon the evidence. It was admitted that the serv- 
ices had been rendered and that payment had been received- 
but payment was in the form of checks drawn upon the Common- 
wealth Trust Company of St. Louis, and were deposited by Sen- 
ator Burton in the Riggs National Bank of Washington, D. C. 
The Riggs National gave credit for the amount immediately and, 
as testified by the cashier, this gave the depositor the privilege 
of drawing at once for the full amount. In this setting the court 
ruled that the check when deposited belonged to the Riggs Bank, 
so that payment was made to it and not to Senator Burton in St. 
Louis. The evidence was therefore held not to support the in- 
dictment. The Riggs bank was a "purchaser," not an "agent."'6 
The court in the Burton case did not appear to have made 
any extensive investigation of the various incidents of such a 
deposit, but relied almost exclusively on the language of prior 
cases in which the transaction was described as a "purchase," 
although in none was the purpose at issue in any way compar- 
able to that involved in the Burton case. The three leading cases 
cited deserve special notice. The most recent was that of Taft 
v. Quinsigamond National Bank,17 decided six years before in 
Massachusetts. The controversy there was between the deposi- 
t5 196 U. S. 283, 25 Sup. Ct. 243 (1905). 
16 It is amazing the influence the Burton case has had on subsequent 
litigation involving purely banking questions. The real issue in the Burton 
case was primarily one as to how strictly the penal statute in the case 
should be enforced. 
1712 Mass. 363, 52 N. E. 387 (1899). 
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tor and the bank of deposit, the Quinsigamond National Bank of 
Worcester, Massachusetts. The deposit was of a check drawn on 
a bank located in Edgemont, South Dakota, and payable to the 
plaintiff. The latter's account was credited on August 2, 1897, 
when the item was deposited. It appears that the item was 
promptly sent forward for collection, but the defendant's corre- 
spondent sent the item directly to the drawee in Edgemont. No 
word of its fate was received by the defendant until September 
8, 1897. Then, after some endeavor to effect collection, the de- 
fendant on November 19, 1897 charged the amount back to the 
plaintiff when writing up his passbook. Upon these facts the 
court held that "when, without more, a bank receives upon de- 
posit a check indorsed without restriction, and gives credit for 
it to the depositor as cash in a drawing account, the form of the 
transaction is consistent with and indicates a sale, in which, as 
with money so deposited, the check becomes the absolute prop- 
erty of the banker." The court mentioned, as being consistent 
with this view but not necessitating the result, that the depositor 
had been allowed to draw against the credit. Thus the court 
reached the conclusion that the defendant having purchased the 
item did not have the power to reverse the transaction. The 
court cited no authority at all in point for this proposition.18 
The next earlier case relied upon by the court in the Burton 
case was that of Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd.l9 This 
also involved a deposit of a demand item, but again the question 
before the court was entirely different from that in any of the 
preceding cases. On October 29, 1878, Murray deposited with 
the Merchants & Mechanics Bank of Troy, N. Y. a check for 
$305 drawn to his order by the defendant. The check, which 
had been properly indorsed, was credited to Murray's account 
in his passbook and was then mailed on the same day to the 
plaintiff, duly indorsed, by the Merchants & Mechanics Bank, 
for credit to its account, which was at the time overdrawn. 
18 In Heinrich v. First National Bank, 219 N. Y. 1, 113 N. E. 531 (1916), 
a similar case, the deposited check having remained unpresented for some 
ten months while reposing behind a radiator in a Philadelphia Post Office, 
the bank was also refused the privilege of charging the amount of the 
credit back to its customer. 
In the words of Judge Cardozo, "The defendant has suffered loss because 
checks which it was collecting in its own behalf, as owner and not as agent, 
miscarried in the mails, and because after notice of the mishap, it slept 
upon its rights." Accord, although here too the bank showed a practice 
of giving immediate credit to the depositor in his checking account under 
circumstances allowing of charge back in case of dishonor. Aebi v. Bank 
of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73, 102 N. W. 329 (1905). As to the charge back 
custom the court said: "Such being the transaction, the right of the de- 
fendant to charge back the amount of this check or to collect from the 
plaintiff is only that resulting from the relation of indorsee and indorser." 
19 90 N. Y. 530 (1882). 
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Murray appears to have learned of the failure of the Merchants 
& Mechanics Bank before the item was presented for payment 
and to have had payment stopped. It was argued that the credit 
given to the defendant was only provisional and that the Mer- 
chants & Mechanics Bank was merely an agent with no author- 
ity to sell the item to the plaintiff. The court ruled, however, 
that when the bank gave Murray credit for the deposit, 
"the property in the check passed from Murray and rested in 
the bank. He was entitled to draw the money so credited to him, 
for as to it the relation of debtor and creditor was formed, and 
the right of Murray to command payment at once was of the 
very essence and nature of the transaction." 
No evidence appears to have been introduced to show that 
drawing would actually have been allowed as stated by the court. 
The Metropolitan Bank case was like each of the foregoing in 
citing no authority squarely in point,20 but equally happy in hav- 
ing urged upon it prior cases where for other purposes the 
banker was deemed an owner of his customer's deposits. Among 
these, the case of Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank,21 relied upon in 
the Burton case, should be considered. The Fulton Bank of New 
York in 1861 sent a collection to the Marine Bank of Chicago 
and, owing to the disturbed state of the currency at the time, 
authorized receipt of payment in Illinois bills, the same to be 
retained by the Marine Bank as a deposit. This was done. Illi- 
nois currency depreciated and the Fulton Bank, upon drawing 
against the deposit some months later, was offered payment in 
Illinois bills. It was held, however, to be entitled to payment in 
legal tender in an amount equal to the dollar value of the deposit 
on the day the account was credited. The court stated that upon 
crediting the Fulton Bank under the circumstances the relation- 
ship of debtor and creditor arose and, further, that although the 
Illinois currency had depreciated it was money belonging to the 
Marine Bank and in which the Fulton Bank was in no way in- 
terested. 
The Marine Bank case 22 serves to point a transition from the 
20 Principal reliance was put on earlier insurance and brokerage cases. 
In Scott v. Ocean Bank, 23 N. Y. 289 (1861), an insurance company oc- 
cupied the position of bank of deposit and as it did not appear to have 
given the depositor credit for the item it was held the transferee was not 
entitled to retain the proceeds. A prior case, Clark v. Merchants Bank, 
2 N. Y. 380 (1849), involved a deposit with brokers who in turn delivered 
the item to the defendant which collected it and applied the proceeds to a 
pre-existing debt of the brokers after their insolvency. Here apparently 
the customer had received credit with authority to draw and judgment was 
for the defendant. 
212 Wall. 252 (U. S. 1864). 
22 In Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663 (U. S. 1867), also cited in the Bur- 
ton case, the converse situation was considered. The court decided that 
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many cases, of which Foley v. Hill 23 is perhaps best known, 
where for one purpose or another the relation of depositor and 
bank has been described as that of debtor and creditor; a gen- 
erality as to which there appears to be no dissent. From this to 
holding that the bank of deposit should suffer any depreciation 
in the particular moneys received, as in the Marine Bank case, 
was but a step, or perhaps logically only a necessary implication 
of that holding. The next step, that of saying that the debtor- 
creditor notion should apply to deposits of demand paper-that 
the bank was a "purchaser"-was a step of greater length. The 
Metropolitan Bank case has been criticized as using the purchase 
idea as a mere device to avoid the rule obtaining in New York 
at the time that a pre-existing debt would not constitute value.24 
While superficially this is plausible, still it would seem unlikely 
that the foregoing series of cases would be based on anything 
so tenuous. It is clear, though, that the court in the Metropoli- 
tan Bank case did not have in support of its position any prior 
banking authority which had gone so far. 
Granting for the moment that the Metropolitan Bank case 
may have taken new ground, still, whatever one's emotional re- 
action to the law may be, the foregoing series of cases must seem 
to the layman like a strange assortment to be regarded almost 
as conclusive authority for each other. Suppose the court in 
1904 did refuse to sustain the indictment of Senator Burton, say- 
ing that the Riggs National had "purchased" the check he de- 
posited with it. Is that to be almost controlling authority for 
the holding in the Douglas case that the City of Douglas should 
have no cause of action as depositor against a correspondent 
collecting agent, or that Rochling should or should not be allowed 
a preferred claim upon the insolvency of Knauth, Nachod & 
Kuhne? And is it to be taken more or less for granted that the 
banking practice prevailing in Douglas, Arizona, in 1920 was 
the same as the practice of the Merchants and Mechanics Bank 
of Troy, New York, in 1878, or of the Quinsigamond National 
Bank in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1897? Perhaps-but it is 
doubtful that either consideration is given much weight. On the 
other hand, while this use of authority may well be subject to 
criticism, still the actual decisions in each case may be satisfac- 
tory. To ascertain this would require a detailed examination into 
all phases of the subject from the practical viewpoint. An inquiry 
deposits of coin made with the Riggs bank in 1861 were likewise not re- 
payable in kind, but, as the relation was merely a general debtor-creditor 
one, the bank could pay in green backs, legal tender. 
23 2 H. L. Cas. 28 (1848). Here it was announced that the relation be- 
tween bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, the issue before 
the court though was merely whether a depositor would be entitled to an 
accounting in equity. 
24 SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS (1st ed. 1919) 67. 
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into some of the cases wherein special facts have been urged 
upon the courts as varying the situation, or in which different 
issues have been raised, should assist, however, in a determina- 
tion. 
The issue may be presented graphically by visualizing a daily 
window deposit. Money and bills are, of course, entered in the 
passbook as cash, but, without any inquiry whatever as to the 
financial standing of the parties, checks also are credited to the 
account. According to the legal view of the transaction above 
set forth, the bank is regarded as having become a purchaser at 
this point. On the same day, however, should the customer 
wish to sell to the bank his notes or trade acceptances evidencing 
business receivables, it would usually be necessary to confer with 
one of the superior officers of the bank, and much information 
as to the customer's financial standing, the transactions out of 
which the items grew and the worth of the other parties to the 
instruments offered would no doubt be required. And even then 
credit would not ordinarily be given for the face value, but for 
face less discount. While, of course, this procedure applies par- 
ticularly to unmatured time items, demand drafts on out-of-town 
points, which may be compared with checks drawn on the same 
points, may be discounted in the same way. In fact, in many 
cases such items would only be taken as collateral, the customer 
being required to sign a note for the principal sum, usually less 
than the value of the collateral. Of course, in either case the 
proceeds would be carried to the drawing account. But why 
make the sharp difference in practice if in legal effect the ordi- 
nary deposit results in a "purchase"? 
Apparently, substantially the foregoing argument was made 
to the court in the Metropolitan Bank case,25 but the court 
brushed it aside by merely asserting that in fact what the par- 
ties had done, as clearly as if it were the result of a formal appli- 
cation for discount, was to "transfer the title" to the check and 
the bank "charged itself with a debt absolutely due" the deposi- 
tor. On what were very similar facts, in so far as they were re- 
ported in the two cases, a Kentucky court, in Falls City Woolen 
Mills v. Louisville National Banking Co.,26 had this to say: 
"There was nothing in the transaction to indicate a purchase 
by the bank of the check. No inquiry was made as to the sol- 
vency of the drawer, or of the bank on which the check was 
drawn. . . . The receiving teller was without authority to 
buy paper. This power was conferred only on other officers of 
the bank. . ." 
25 Supra note 19. 
26 145 Ky. 64, 140 S. W. 66 (1911). See also Strong v. King, 35 Ill. 9 
(1864), saying that agency is presumed as to paper taken by a teller. 
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This argument is plausible-but it would apply equally to 
deposits of money or to checks "cashed" rather than received 
on deposit by the teller. In such cases it is well established that 
the bank is to be regarded as owner. 
The setting of the case before the Kentucky court was quite 
different from that in the Metropolitan Bank case, which may 
perhaps explain the difference in viewpoint. In the Kentucky 
case the plaintiff had deposited with the defendant a check 
drawn on an out-of-town bank and received immediate credit with 
the privilege of drawing if desired. There was evidence of a 
custom on the part of the bank to charge back uncollected items. 
Here, however, the check was duly paid, loss occurring through 
failure of a correspondent to remit the proceeds. The plaintiff 
contended, as was held in the Taft case,27 that the bank was a 
"purchaser" and must bear the loss. Obviously, the item hav- 
ing been paid, the bank had no recourse against its depositor 
upon his indorsement. But without considering the extent of 
legal sanction to be given to the charge-back custom, the court 
decided that the bank was acting merely as "agent" for trans- 
mission rather than as "purchaser," and thus reached the result 
that it was not responsible.28 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the "purchase" theory 
when adopted forecloses all discussion of whether the bank of 
deposit is to be regarded as a collecting agent responsible for 
acts of its sub-agents, the New York collection rule, or as being 
an agent for transmission of the paper to proper correspondents, 
the so-called Massachusetts rule.29 In the Falls City case, the 
court, after refusing the purchase view, applied the Massachu- 
setts collection rule obtaining in Kentucky to reach its result of 
non-responsibility on the part of the bank of deposit. In the 
Kirkham case,30 arising in New York, a case very similar upon 
its facts, it was decided not only that the bank as "purchaser" 
should be responsible to its depositor but, without much discrim- 
ination, also apparently that the result might be justified on the 
theory that the New York bank of deposit as collecting agent 
was responsible for the acts of its correspondent. 
On these limited facts this precise question arises much less 
often today because of the widespread use by banks of stipula- 
27 Supra note 17. 
28 It is interesting to compare this case with the Taft case. Both arose 
in states following the Massachusetts collection rule, that is, that the bank 
of deposit is not liable for acts of correspondents. In the Taft case there 
was evidence of considerable delay, however, on the part of the bank, and 
the court talked purchase. Here the defendant was not directly at fault 
in any way. 
29 For a brief discussion of the two rules, their origin and relative de- 
sirability see Comment (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 753, n. 1. 
30 Kirkham v. Bank of America, 165 N. Y. 132, 58 N. E. 753 (1900). 
883 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:26:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
YALE LAW JOURNAL 
tions to avoid responsibility. The most common clause, in use 
before either the Taft or the Kirkham case was decided, read: 
"This bank in receiving checks or drafts on deposit or for col- 
lection, acts only as your agent, and, beyond carefulness in select- 
ing agents at other points and in forwarding to them, assumes 
no responsibility." 31 
It appears to have been designed primarily to circumvent the 
New York collection rule and did so by stipulating for the 
Massachusetts rule. It is obvious, however, that if given effect 
according to its literal wording it would constitute a stipulation 
against the "purchase" notion as well, the relation being defined 
as one of "agency" instead.3 Indeed, the court in the Taft case, 
while holding the bank responsible on the purchase theory, thus 
reaching the same result as though the New York collection rule 
had been applied, stated that had some such clause as this been 
used it would have been given effect.33 In states having the 
Massachusetts collection rule it became customary to use only 
a short provision, as in the Douglas case, reading: "All out-of- 
town items credited subject to final payment." No doubt seems 
to have existed in the Douglas case but that this would be effec- 
tive to allow of charging an item back to the depositor. The item 
in the Douglas case appears, in fact, to have been charged back 
to the City of Douglas. 
The situation of the City of Douglas after the Supreme Court 
decision had been rendered throws some light on the desirability 
of the result reached in the Douglas case. The court held that 
no recovery could be had against the collecting bank for its neg- 
31 The court in the case of In re Assignment of State Bank, 56 Minn. 
119, 57 N. W. 336 (1894), held that this clause brought about an agency 
situation and that the depositor might reclaim the deposited items from 
the receiver of the bank of deposit. It was said the credit under the cir- 
cumstances was "merely provisional, and the privilege of drawing against 
it merely gratuitous." 
32 Stipulations of this sort however have uniformly been held effective 
to accomplish their main purpose, that is, to relieve the bank of responsi- 
bility for acts of correspondents. A large number of cases might be cited. 
In Capital Grain & Feed Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 3 F. 
(2d) 614 (N. D. Ga. 1925), the New York bank of deposit used the follow- 
ing clause "This bank acts only as collecting agent and assumes no liabil- 
ity on account of delay or loss in transit or until it receives final actual 
payment from its correspondents." This was said by the court to negative 
both the purchase and the New York collection agency rule so that suit 
could be brought directly against the collecting bank alleged to have acted 
negligently. 
33 "So a bank by general notices printed in its passbooks or deposit slips, 
or otherwise brought to the knowledge of its depositor, or by agreement 
with the particular depositor as to his own deposit or by crediting paper 
as paper and not as cash . . . may define its position as that of agent 
or purchaser." Taft v. Quinsigamond Nat. Bk., supra note 17. 
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ligence, there being no privity. The "charge back" by the bank 
of deposit presumably being sanctioned as well, the depositor 
was left apparently with no recovery against anyone whatever. 
There have been few cases going so far. In Downey v. National 
Exchange Bank,34 squarely in point with the Douglas case and 
reaching the same result, the item was charged back to the de- 
positor, apparently pursuant to a charge back provision, al- 
though the point was not mentioned, and the court said: 
"When the check was returned to the bank of Arlington and 
was by it turned over to appellant (the depositor) and was by 
him accepted and charged to his account by the bank, this con- 
stituted a resale of the check to the appellant." 
Notwithstanding this resale, however, the court refused recov- 
ery against the correspondent, stating that there was no privity 
of contract between the depositor and the correspondent. 
The point has caused considerable trouble.35 In Weed v. 
Boston & Maine R. R.,36 the Maine court followed the supposed 
implications of the word purchase to the logical extreme. The 
3452 Ind. App. 672, 96 N. E. 403 (1911). 
35 There have been a number of cases where the bank has charged the 
item back against its customer's account causing an apparent overdraft 
and yet where the courts have considered the bank still to be owner, the 
item being retained by it. For example in Royal Bank of Scotland v. 
Tottenham [1894] 2 Q. B. 715, a post-dated check was deposited, credit be- 
ing given. Upon its dishonor it was charged back creating an over-draft 
but the bank was held entitled to collect in full as holder for value. The 
court said the charge back, at least, was not equivalent to payment. 
In Standard Trust Co. v. Comm'l National Bank, 240 Fed. 303 (C. C. 
A. 4th, 1917), the bank of deposit had forwarded the item through corre- 
spondents to the defendant for remittance. The defendant delayed two 
or three days during which time it might have paid. It then returned 
the item unpaid to the plaintiff, which charged it to the depositors account, 
the item being retained. The drawer's account was subsequently exhausted 
when other unpaid items came back. It was held that under the circum- 
stances the plaintiff was still to be regarded as owner and might recover 
notwithstanding the charge back. Accord, Union Electric Steel Co. v. Im- 
perial Bank, 286 Fed. 857 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923), where the bank of deposit 
sued on the retained charged back item. But in Tovrea & Co. v. Degnan, 
27 Ariz. 539, 234 Pac. 820 (1925), it was held that, assuming the bank be- 
came owner upon the deposit of the draft, still in view of the charge back, 
creditors of the depositor might attach the relative goods. Apparently 
here the charged account was sufficient for the purpose although the point 
was not mentioned. 
The possibility of requiring a receiver of an insolvent bank of deposit 
to charge back an unpaid deposited item was considered in Bryant v. Wil- 
liams, 16 F. (2d) 159 (E. D. N. C. 1926). It was held the bank was a 
purchaser and under no obligation to charge back at the depositor's re- 
quest. In the case of In re Bank of Minnesota, 75 Minn. 186, 77 N. W. 
796 (1899), the failed bank had used the "as your agent" clause and the 
court required the charge back. 
36124 Me. 336, 128 Atl. 696 (1925). 
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deposit was of a draft with an attached bill of lading for a car 
of potatoes. While the bank was holding the draft the car was 
broken into and some of the potatoes stolen. Upon the buyer's 
refusal to take up the draft the item was charged back to the 
shipper. Near the end of the statutory period, apparently hav- 
ing no other recourse, the depositor commenced action in his 
own name against the carrier for alleged conversion. The court 
cited the Burton case for the proposition that the bank had be- 
come a "purchaser" when the item was deposited, and from this 
it moved to the position that the conversion must, therefore, have 
been of the bank's potatoes.37 The case is of particular interest 
as the court recognized that the charge back operated as an 
"assignment" of the bank's rights against the carrier. Never- 
theless, it was held that the assignor could only sue in the name 
of the bank. 
Even if a theory of assignment is to be worked out in these 
cases so as to allow of suit by the depositor against correspon- 
dent banks, it has been slow developing and in the meantime 
many depositors have been deprived of all recovery.38 Presum- 
ably in any case, the depositor's rights as assignee would be 
subject to any set-off or defense good against the bank of deposit. 
Under pressure of this unsatisfactory situation it might be ex- 
pected that courts would begin to find an "agency" where for 
other purposes the facts would perhaps still be described as 
showing a "purchase." In the most recent case possibly ex- 
plainable in this way, that of Dudley v. Phenix-Girard Bank,39 
the depositor received credit as in the Douglas case, "subject to 
final payment." With no discussion whatever of the "purchase" 
idea applied in the Douglas case, the court elected to follow the 
Massachusetts collection rule rather than the New York rule, 
thus absolving the bank of deposit from the alleged negligence 
of its correspondent the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The 
court relied chiefly on a late Texas case 40 where also the bank of 
deposit was exonerated under the Massachusetts collection rule, 
37 Whatever view is taken concerning the bank's interest in the draft, 
whether as agent, pledgee or purchaser, the documents accompanying the 
draft, and of course the property covered by the documents, would seem 
best regarded as collateral for its payment. For example in Wilson Grain 
Co. v. Central National Bank, 139 S. W. 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), the 
court said: "It could hold and control the oats until the draft was paid, 
and if it was not paid could dispose of the oats if necessary to repay itself 
the money advanced or paid by it for the draft; but it did not in fact 
buy the oats, and its ownership was limited to the extent above indicated." 
The situation is ably discussed in Comment (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 63. 
38 Gulf States Lumber Co. v. Citizens First Nat. Bank, 30 Ga. App. 709, 
119 S. E. 426 (1923). This court defeated the depositor because he did not 
have a formal assignment from the bank. 
9 114 So. 1881 (Ala. 1927). 
40 Tillman Co. Bank v. Behringer, 113 Tex. 415, 257 S. W. 206 (1923). 
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while if the Massachusetts "purchase" rule had been applied, as 
in the Taft case, the bank of deposit would have been held re- 
sponsible. All of the essential facts relied upon to show a "pur- 
chase" appeared in each case. In several other states the same 
result has been reached, the Massachusetts collection rule being 
applied.41 But in Brown v. Peoples Bank,42 the Florida court held 
the bank of deposit responsible to its depositor where the pro- 
ceeds of the deposited item had not been received by it due to the 
failure of the collecting bank. These cases, if we except the 
Florida decision, indicate that the purchase idea is not looked 
upon with entire favor in the exact situation presented, that is, 
where the depositor sues his own bank. It would seem, also, 
that if the action were against the correspondent the courts de- 
ciding these cases would be fairly committed to allowing a re- 
covery, contrary to the results of the Douglas case. 
The Brown v. Peoples Bank decision was followed by legisla- 
tion in Florida providing that the bank of deposit in these cir- 
cumstances would "only be liable after actual payment received 
by it." The Supreme Court in the Malloy case,43 a decision 
handed down only a year or so before the decision in the Douglas 
case, had occasion to construe this statute in a typical purchase 
situation. The court, however, interpreted the statute as equiva- 
lent to the adoption of the Massachusetts collection rule and thus 
allowed suit to be brought against the correspondent collecting 
bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, for negligence in 
handling the item. Had the "purchase" notion been given consid- 
eration, it would seem that the court logically could no more have 
applied the Massachusetts collection rule than did the Massachu- 
setts court in the Taft case. True, this would have deprived the 
depositor of all action,44 except again as he might be said to have 
41 Fausett v. State Bank, 21 S. D. 248, 123 N. W. 686 (1909); Wilson v. 
Carlinsville Bank, 187 Ill. 222, 58 N. E. 250 (1900); Hazlett v. Commercial 
Bank, 132 Pa. 118, 19 Atl. 55 (1890). It is doubtful though that these 
courts would regard the bank as in any sense a "purchaser" of the paper 
and in such case their position on this point is at least consistent. The 
Pennsylvania court said: "The mere fact that the collecting bank credited 
him with the check as cash did not alter that relation (agency). This is 
done daily. Indeed it is the almost universal usage to credit such collec- 
tions as cash, unless the customer making such deposit is in weak credit. 
If the check is unpaid, it is charged on again, and the unpaid check re- 
turned to the depositor." 
42 59 Fla. 163, 52 So. 719 (1910). 
43 Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296 (1924). 
44 It is intimated in Capital Grain & Feed Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 
supra note 32, that this consideration may well have operated to bring the 
court to its conclusion that suit might be brought against a remote sub- 
agent. The decision is remarkable in that there was good authority to the 
effect that, if the first bank stipulated for the Massachusetts collection rule 
(and the statute outside of Florida would seem to be of no greater signi- 
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taken by assignment a cause of action accrued to his bank, but it 
would be a situation no worse than that in which the court ap- 
pears to have left the City of Douglas. 
But it is doubtful that the statute 45 was designed to adopt a 
"collection" rule to the exclusion of the "purchase" rule. It 
would seem to have been expressly drawn to relieve the deposi- 
tor's bank of responsibility for acts of its correspondents. Is 
such a provision fatal to the purchase notion? May not a bank 
be a "purchaser" and yet at the same time be held not to bear the 
risks incident to collection? This was exactly what was stipu- 
lated for in the Douglas case by the provision: "all out-of-town 
items credited subject to final payment." Of course the statute 
may have gone one step further; it definitely covered the contin- 
gency that even though the item should be paid, in the sense 
that secondary parties would be discharged, still the bank would 
not be responsible until the proceeds were received by it. But 
exactly this interpretation has been placed upon the Douglas 
case stipulation, that is, final payment is said to mean final pay- 
ment actually made to the bank of deposit.46 It may be inferred 
ficance) the stipulation would serve only to exonerate it, and the next 
bank in the chain not using such a waiver would be deemed to have as- 
sumed the responsibility of an original collecting bank under the New York 
rule and it alone could be sued for defaults of subsequent banks. McBride 
v. Illinois National Bank, 163 App. Div. 417, 148 N. Y. Supp. 654 (lst Dept. 
1914). The Florida statute was thus not only construed to abolish the pur- 
chase rule, but in this situation at least, the New York collection rule. 
For a criticism of the holding in the Malloy case on the point that it 
was negligence on the part of the collecting bank to accept payment by 
bank draft in the customary way, see Comment (1924) 33 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 752. In the case of Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Federal Reserve 
Bank, 214 N. W. 918 (Minn. 1927), the Minnesota court in a carefully 
reasoned opinion refused to subscribe to the views of the Supreme Court 
on this point. 
45 The statute read: "That when a check, draft, note or other negotiable 
instrument is deposited in a bank for credit or for collection, it shall be 
considered due diligence on the part of the bank in the collection of any 
check, draft, note or other negotiable instrument so deposited, to forward 
and route the same without delay in the usual commercial way in use 
according to the regular course of business of banks, and that the maker, 
indorser, guarantor or surety of any check, draft, note or other negotiable 
instrument, so deposited, shall be liable to the bank until actual final pay- 
ment is received, and that when a bank receives for collection any check, 
draft, note or other negotiable instrument and forwards the same for col- 
lection as herein provided, it shall only be liable after actual final payment 
is received by it, except in case of want of due diligence on its part as 
aforesaid." Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920) ? 4748. 
It would seem almost impossible to interpret this as excluding the "pur- 
chase" notion although it very carefully provides that the risks incident to 
collection shall be borne by the depositor. 
46 "The words on the deposit slip, 'all items credited subject to final pay- 
ment' mean that the credit is given subject to the final payment to the 
bank, and that the credit may be withdrawn if the item is not paid to the 
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that the court in the Douglas case did not understand the provi- 
sion to go so far, and possibly this may be said to be the dis- 
tinction between the cases, but it is fair to say that there is no 
intimation in either opinion that this should be the dividing line. 
Whatever the accepted interpretation of "subject to final pay- 
ment" may turn out to be, many banks, in the absence of legisla- 
tion similar to the Florida statute, make it perfectly clear that 
all risks of collection up to the time when they are in receipt of 
payment in cash or solvent credits are to be borne by the deposi- 
tor.47 
Banking practice has gone a long way to reach this point. It 
appears that formerly it was not customary for banks to charge 
back unpaid items to their customer's account. The practice 
seems to have been to notify the depositor that his item had been 
dishonored and to request him to make it good. Often this was 
done by the depositor giving the bank his check drawn upon the 
account. Possibly this was too slow. At any rate the practice 
grew up of charging the customer's account, merely notifying 
him thereafter of the fact. This, by stipulation or by statute, 
is now sanctioned even where the item has in fact been paid, the 
loss occurring through the default or failure of collecting banks' 
remitting the proceeds. There is one limitation, and that is where 
the bank of deposit has itself been negligent.48 Of course, here 
bank." Falls City Woolen Mills v. Louisville Nat. Banking Co., supra note 
26. 
47 For example in Security Savings & Trust Co. v. King, 69 Or. 228, 138 
Pac. 465 (1914), the clause read: "In receiving checks, drafts or other 
paper on deposit payable elsewhere than in Portland this bank assumes 
no liability for the failure of any of its direct or indirect collecting agents 
whether the collecting agent be the person or concern on which the check 
for collection is drawn or not, and shall only be held liable when proceeds 
in actual funds or solvent credits shall have come into its possession. 
Under these provisions items previously credited may be charged back to 
the depositor's account. .. ." The court held this effective to allow 
of recovery by the bank against the depositor for an alleged over-draft 
when payment had been actually made by the drawee to the collecting 
bank, but returned because of mistake. It was not yet in receipt of "sol- 
vent credits" presumably. 
48In Harter v. Bank of Brunson, 92 S. C. 440, 75 S. E. 696 (1912), the 
clause read: "For value received, we the undersigned hereby agree in de- 
positing the items listed below for collection or credit . . . that we 
will not hold the bank liable to us for said items until the cash for each 
has been paid to the Bank. . ." It appeared that the bank of deposit 
after forwarding the item had done nothing about it for several months. 
It was refused the privilege of charging the items back, the New York 
collection fule being held to apply. Compare Martin v. Home Bank, 30 
App. Div. 498, 52 N. Y. Supp. 464 (lst Dept. 1898), where the court said 
that inasmuch as the bank of deposit had delayed presentment it could be 
held responsible whether "agent" or "purchaser." 
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too, the result will vary depending on whether the "purchase" 
or the New York or Massachusetts "collection" rule obtains.49 
To many courts the very idea of charging back a credit given 
upon a deposited item is wholly repugnant to the conception of 
purchase which they entertain.50 It is at the same time generally 
recognized that the secondary responsibility of the depositor to 
his bank upon the item either in his capacity as drawer or as 
indorser cannot well be said to conflict. And many courts have 
sought to reconcile the charge back practice with the idea of pur- 
chase by saying that the legal basis for reversing a credit entry 
of this character is simply that it is merely another means of 
enforcing the depositor's obligation as a secondary party.51 But 
it is obvious that if this is so it is a somewhat extra-legal method. 
Indorsees generally proceed in quite a different manner to re- 
cover of their indorsers. Furthermore, it is quite apparent that 
the various clauses such as "credited subject to final payment" 
were designed for the very purpose of allowing a charge back, 
say in the situation before the court in the Taft case, where, 
through delay on the part of the correspondent, the depositor 
49 If the bank is to be regarded as in any sense an "agent" rather than 
a "purchaser" it will probably not be held responsible for the face amount 
of the item in cases where it can show the depositor was not actually dam- 
aged in that amount. The latest holding in New York on the point is 
Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Levine, Inc., 247 N. Y. 20, 159 N. E. 708 
(1928). The converse would appear to be true in the purchase case. See 
Kirkham v. Bank of America, supra note 30. 
50 The situation presented when a bank reverses a credit given for a 
raisedf item or one bearing a prior forged indorsement is of course quite 
different from the charge back here discussed. See Closter National Bank 
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 285 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), which sanc- 
tioned a charge back pursuant to a stipulation that raised items could be 
charged back at any time. The fact that as to deposits of such kind this 
may be done would seem to have no bearing on the general problem of 
whether an "agency" or a "purchase" exists in the usual case. But see 
an interesting comment, Bank Stipulations to Avoid a Presumption of Pur- 
chase in Collection Cases (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 73. 
51 The court in the case of Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83 Pac. 1048 
(1905), cited with approval by the court in the Burton case, had this to 
say: "Whether this right may be said to rest merely on custom of banks, 
or whether the custom has been crystallized into a rule and the right may 
now be said to be an implied condition attaching to the transfer of the 
paper makes no difference. It is nevertheless, in strictness, the right of 
an indorsee against an indorser, and hence is not in any sense inconsistent 
with ownership." 
Although this has become the orthodox statement of the case there would 
really appear, today, in view of long dealing between the parties, a broader 
basis for the practice even in the absence of stipulations. It may well be 
said to have become woven into the bank-depositor relationship. For ex- 
ample the privilege does not appear ever to have been questioned for the 
reason that the item was not negotiable. And these very courts grant that 
the custom may well operate as a waiver of strict proceedings upon dis- 
honor. 
890 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:26:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DEPOSITS OF DEMAND PAPER 
would no doubt have been discharged on the item. Of course, 
the present stipulations definitely providing for charge back even 
though the item has in fact been paid go much beyond this limit. 
It is indeed interesting to observe the attitude of the courts 
with respect to this changing practice. In the Metropolitan Bank 
case the court labeled the transaction "purchase," but gave the 
matter of charge back no consideration whatever. In the Doug- 
las case, and, in this respect it is typical of those courts adhering 
to the "purchase" rule, the court said: 
"While there is not entire uniformity of opinion, the weight 
of authority supports the view that upon the deposit of paper 
unrestrictedly indorsed, and credit of the amount to the deposi- 
tor's account, the bank becomes the owner of the paper, notwith- 
standing a custom or agreement to charge the paper back to the 
depositor in the event of dishonor." 
It cited as authority prior cases involving different issues, not 
one of which had had before it a stipulation similar to that in 
the Douglas case. 
By way of further illustration, the problem may be examined 
from still a different angle, one involving other issues. It is 
customary in some lines for the seller to deposit his draft on the 
buyer in a bank with shipping documents attached, receiving im- 
mediate credit in his checking account. Well departmentalized 
banks regard this as a discount transaction as distinguished 
from a deposit.52 In the case of time items, particularly, it is 
customary to give credit only for the face amount less discount. 
Demand items payable out of town are often handled in the 
same way, the discount being calculated on the estimated time 
the item will require for collection, with an understanding that 
a further adjustment either way may be made if necessary; 
or possibly the face amount will be credited and a single interest 
charge will be made when the item's fate is determined.53 As 
stated earlier, however, in point of legal theory there would 
seem to be no distinction, for, if ordinary deposits of demand 
items are regarded as "purchases," all the more clearly the dis- 
count of such items, whichever method is employed, would fall 
in that category. And it does not appear that any court in this 
52 WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 540. 
53 In Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 
Pac. 869 (1920) (involving a demand draft) and Walker & Brock v. Ran- 
lett Co., 89 Vt. 71, 93 Atl. 1054 (1914) (deposit of "on arrival" draft) the 
depositor was credited with face under such an interest arrangement. In 
the Weed case, supra note 36, the credit was apparently of face less dis- 
count. In the Ranlett case, supra, the court said, "The arrangement for 
interest may well have been in lieu of discountt at least, it was entirely 
consistent with an intention that title to the draft should pass to the 
claimant." 
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country in recent years has taken any distinction in this regard 
between time and demand items.54 
Here again the "purchase" theory receives a severe test. 
Altogether too often the buyer, after taking up the draft and 
documents, asserts a claim against the seller, usually for alleged 
breach of warranty, and brings suit by attaching the proceeds in 
the hands of the local collecting bank. The case is tried at the 
buyer's point. There is usually some evidence that the buyer may 
in fact have a bona fide claim. The intervention of the bank from 
a distant point claiming to be the owner of the draft may readily 
be made to appear before a jury as but an attempt to save the 
seller.55 And, as might be expected in the circumstances, many 
courts are far from holding, upon being shown the essential 
"purchase" facts, that a verdict should be directed for the inter- 
vening bank.56 Quite the contrary! The case is often submitted 
to the jury with results adverse to the bank. In Texas a directed 
verdict for the intervening bank was held error, inasmuch as 
the court felt that the circumstance that interest was to be 
charged while the item was outstanding tended to show "agen- 
cy." 57 And as a matter of procedure, when the case is submitted 
to a jury, many courts require the bank, as intervenor, to bear the 
burden of the issue.58 
54 The case of In re Assignment of State Bank, supra note 31, cited with 
approval the leading English authority on time paper, Giles v. Perkins, 9 
East 12 (1807), although the decision turned largely on the "as agent" 
stipulation. 
55 Townsend Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Chamberlaine Canning Co., 277 
S. W. 958 (Mo. App. 1926). The case involved shipment of a car of to- 
matoes. It is very evident from the report that the jury was enormously 
influenced by the argument that to defeat the attachment would in effect be 
allowing the bank to shield its customer, the seller. 
56 For example the court in Kaplan v. Ferson Hay & Grain Co., 140 
S. E. 617 (N. C. 1927), approved the action of the lower court in refusing 
to charge that if the jury believed the evidence it should find for the bank. 
The North Carolina court, however, is unable to reconcile any possibility 
of charge back with purchase. In strictness it should have directed a ver- 
dict for the buyer, but the result is ordinarily the same if the case is left 
to the jury. 
57 Mayfield Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 287 S. W. 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). 
The case involved a shipment of beans from California to Texas. It is 
almost inconceivable that evidence of an arrangement to charge interest 
would have any value to show "agency"-just the contrary. 
58 Townsend Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Chamberlaine Canning Co., supra 
note 55; Kaplan v. Ferson Hay & Grain Co., supra note 56; but in Provi- 
dent National Bank v. Cairo Flour Co., 226 S. W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1921), a case involving a shipment of hay from Idaho to Texas, the jury 
was instructed that the burden of the issue was upon the buyer. The jury 
found that he had sustained the burden but the upper court reversed the 
judgment. The evidence indicated not only that the item had been taken 
as a purchase, but that drawings had been allowed against it. In Dubuque 
Fruit Co. v. Emerson & Co., 201 Iowa 129, 206 N. W. 672 (1926), the court 
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In these cases, also, the point most damaging to the bank's 
position has been the charge back practice.59 Most courts, how- 
ever, here also regard charge back, at least where it appears to 
be about the same as enforcing the depositor's responsibility as 
endorser, to be quite consistent with the purchase doctrine.60 
There is, though, a further consideration appearing in many 
of these cases, and that is as to the significance which should be 
attached to actual drawing on the part of the depositor against 
the credit in his favor. In the orthodox purchase cases the 
power to draw has been considered to follow necessarily from 
immediate credit.61 In the early Metropolitan Bank case as well 
as in the late Rochling case, power to draw at once was assumed.62 
But in the "agency" view drawing has been regarded purely as 
a concession which the banks might extend or not in its discre- 
tion. There is no way in the ordinary case of objectively deter- 
mining in which way drawings may have been made.63 Some 
approved a judgment for the intervening bank, the lower court having re- 
fused to submit evidence that the bank while holding the item had allowed 
a reduction in the draft at the shipper's request. This seems quite propet 
and in accord with the weight of authority. See also National Bk. of Webb 
City v. Everett & Son, 136 Ga. 372, 71 S. E. 660 (1911) (judgment on ver- 
dict for buyer set aside). 
59 The North Carolina statement of the matter is to the point. "The 
rule prevails with us, and it is supported by the weight of authority else- 
where (?), that if a bank discounts a paper and places the amount, less 
the discount, to the credit of the indorser, with the right to check on it, and 
reserves the right to charge back the amount if the paper is not paid, by 
express agreement or one implied from the course of dealing, and not by 
reason of liability on the indorsement, the bank is an agent for collection 
and not a purchaser." Worth v. Feed Co., 172 N. C. 335, 342, 90 S. E. 
295, 298 (1916). 
The rule, announced in a garnishment case, is applied without distinc- 
tion in other situations. For example in First National Bank v. Rocha- 
mora, 193 N. C. 1, 136 S. E. 259 (1927), the bank of deposit was not per- 
mitted to recover upon a trade acceptance as holder in due course inasmuch 
as it was regarded as an agent and not a purchaser. 
60 Many cases following the purchase view might be cited but the fol- 
lowing are all clean cut decisions on the point: Acme Hay & Mill Feed 
Company v. Metropolitan Nat. Bk., 198 Iowa 1337, 201 N. W. 129 (1924); 
Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., supra note 53; Walker & 
Brock v. Ranlett Co., supra note 53. 
In the case last cited the court said: "It (charge back) was, or may well 
have been, simply a method adopted by the bank to collect from the drawer 
in case the draft was dishonored." 
61 If a bank fails to honor checks in such situation it may be held re- 
sponsible for slander of credit. Dirnfield v. Fourteenth Street Sav. Bank, 
37 App. D. C. 11 (1911). 
62 Supra notes 19 and 7. 
63 It should be clear also that the matter of following the intention of 
the parties, stated by some courts as the test, is equally useless. And it 
is believed the matter of who has the title, with distinctions as to absolute 
and conditional title, is worse than useless as an aid to deciding these cases. 
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courts, nominally inclined to the "agency" view, have, however, 
looked to evidence of drawing as persuasive of purchase.64 The 
more logical view was taken by the Tennessee court in Barton 
Seed, Feed & Implement Co. v. Mercantile National Bank,65 in 
which it said: 
"In brief, the bank holds the paper substantially in pledge for 
credit extended, and it must show the extent of its interest when 
a creditor of the pledgor seeks to subject it as the property of 
the latter." 66 
This view would seem, at first glance at least, to hold the bal- 
ance fairly even between all parties. It is surely immaterial for 
the particular case if in fact the proceeds are exempted from 
garnishment, whether the bank is said to be a "purchaser" or 
a "pledgee." But the possibility of a bank establishing itself as 
a lien holder, especially where the depositor maintains an active 
account and in fact has sufficient funds to meet the claim on 
You can not determine title, intention, or for that matter whether drawing 
is allowed merely as a concession, until you have assessed the objective 
facts involved. Of course having done that there may be some value in 
translating the determination arrived at into such terms. 
64 Scott v. W. H. McIntyre Co., 93 Kan. 508, 144 Pac. 1002 (1914). 
Here although (1) interest was being charged until the proceeds were 
received (2) the item had been numbered as a collection as distinguished 
from a cash item and (3) privilege of charge back had been reserved, the 
court regarded the circumstance that the depositor had drawn against the 
deposit as controlling. It intimated further that this would be true even 
if the item had been restrictively indorsed, a doubtful point. To the same 
effect is First Nat. Bank v. McMillan, 15 Ga. App. 319, 83 S. E. 149 (1914) 
wherein the court said that where drawings have been allowed "the bank 
acquires title to the goods represented by the bill of lading, and its title 
can be asserted against the lien of a subsequent attachment creditor of 
the assignor." 
65128 Tenn. 320, 160 S. W. 848 (1913). Accord, Sabel v. Planters Na- 
tional Bank, 110 Ky. 299, 61 S. W. 367 (1901), and see Vickers v. Machin- 
ery Warehouse & Sales Co., supra note 53, where the Washington court 
recognized the lien possibility assuming an agency situation existed. In 
Groveland Banking Co. v. City National Bank, 144 Tenn. 520, 234 S. W. 
643 (1921), the court described the case as one of purchase, there having 
been drawings and no "agency" or "charge back" clause having been used. 
The Tennessee court in the Implement Company case stated its position 
on the charge back practice as follows: "We are of the opinion that the 
agreement to charge back in case the paper should be returned is a con- 
trolling consideration. It is irreconcilable with absolute ownership on the 
part of the bank." 
66 The North Carolina court, while still subscribing to the agency view 
in the ordinary case, has protected the bank against attaching creditors 
of the depositdr, even though the item had been charged back to its cus- 
tomer, it being shown that, both at the time of the deposit and subse- 
quently at the time of the charge back the account was overdrawn almost 
to the extent of the item. Latham v. Spragins, 162 N. C. 404, 78 S. E. 282 
(1913). 
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deposit when the attachment is filed, is remote compared with 
the similar possibility on the purchase theory.67 Perhaps some 
rule based upon the idea that first drawings are made against 
first credits might be developed to show that the bank's lien in- 
terest had accrued even though the account continued in funds, 
but it is unlikely.68 Of course on the purchase view it is im- 
material what the state of the account between bank and deposi- 
tor may be at the time of the attachment.69 Certainly if, as has 
been held,70 the attaching creditor prevails providing only it is 
shown that at the time of the attachment the bank could have 
hurried to cover by charging its depositor's account, the security 
afforded by this paper would be wholly illusory. It is believed 
that the benefits to accrue to all parties from protecting items 
of this character from attachment far outweigh the procedural 
gain to an occasional buyer found in allowing the process.71 
67 It is more than probable that the intervening bank would have the 
burden of establishing its lien position also while, of course, if it had been 
viewed as a holder of the draft rather than as an agent it would be prima 
facie a holder for value, the instrument being negotiable. Tolerton & 
Stetson Co. v. Bank, 112 Iowa 706, 84 N. W. 930 (1901). 
Those courts nominally following the purchase view which put the bur- 
den on the intervening bank to justify its claim to the proceeds present a 
strange state of affairs. While the draft is held by the discounting bank 
or its collecting agent it would be a presumed holder of the draft for value 
with the documents as collateral, but upon payment the position is exactly 
reversed in these courts. 
68 It is interesting to compare National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 
207 Ala. 65, 92 So. 10 (1921), an attachment case in which it was shown 
that at all times the depositor's account exceeded the amount of the item 
the proceeds of which were being garnished, although drawings to a greater 
amount had been allowed in the interim. The court assumed, for purposes 
of the case, that the purchase idea should govern and then proceeded to hold 
that the bank was not a holder in due course because it had given no value 
and from this it reached the conclusion that the attaching creditor should 
prevail. The court took a minority view on what constitutes value refusing 
to follow Merchants Nat. Bank v. Santa Maria Sugar Co., 162 App. Div. 
248, 147 N. Y. Supp. 498 (lst Dept. 1914), and wholly misconceived the prob- 
lem before it in insisting that the bank should be a holder in due course. 
69 First Nat. Bank v. Milling Co., 103 Iowa 518, 72 N. W. 689 (1897). 
Here the attachment was served before any drawings were had. See also 
National Bank v. Bradley, 264 Fed. 700 (W. D. N. Y. 1920). 
70 Wilson Grain Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 139 S. W. 996 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1911). Contra: Sabel v. Planters Nat. Bank, supra note 65. This 
would appear to be the better position but it would seem probable from the 
case of National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, supra note 68, that the 
Alabama court would follow the Texas case. 
71 The language of the dissent in Mayfield Co. v. First Nat. Bank, sup-'a 
note 57, is pertinent: "If the law should ever be declared to the effect 
that banks are not entitled to protect themselves in the manner shown here 
for advancements made to facilitate the handling of grain, cotton and other 
products in large quantities, such holding would certainly greatly hamper 
the marketing of such products." 
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Strangely enough, few of the cases appear to have discussed 
the conflict of laws question involved. For example, in the Fer- 
son case,72 the shipment was of hay from Kansas to North Caro- 
lina. The North Carolina court had no hesitation in taking the 
"agency" view, yet in Kansas, where the bank acquired the 
paper, the Kansas court in the case of Mercantile Co. v. Bank,~3 
followed the "purchase" theory to defeat attachment, the case 
involving a shipment of two cars of potatoes from Oklahoma. 
But to carry the matter no further, it would appear from First 
National Bank z. Munding,7 a case concerning a shipment of 
grain from Arkansas to Oklahoma, that the "agency" view is 
followed in Oklahoma to allow of attachment. It would seem that 
the interest of the bank of deposit should be ascertained by the 
law of the place of deposit. In the principal case considering 
the question, that of Fourth National Bank v. Bragg,75 the Vir- 
ginia court fortified its decision denying the attachment on the 
"purchase" theory, by citation of Alabama authority to the same 
effect, the shipment having originated in Alabama. No doubt 
if this were followed the "purchase" view would be regarded 
more favorably in the interest of protecting local shippers. But 
if the attitude of the courts in the bank collection cases76 is 
to serve as a guide, each court will continue to reach its own 
conclusion as to whether the ordinary deposit facts constitute 
a "purchase" or not. 
Enough has been said to indicate, without in any sense pur- 
porting to exhaust the subject, that there are many considera- 
tions to be taken into account. Especially so if only one word as 
"purchase" or "agency" is to be used to cover satisfactorily all 
It would in this view perhaps be desirable to exempt such items from 
attachment altogether as, even on the purchase view the possibility that 
the bank will have to go to a distant state to establish its position is 
enough to make it less ready to take any paper subject to such a con- 
tingency. The real protection to the buyer should be in careful inspection 
before taking up the goods. Certainly the Mississippi view that the col- 
lecting bank must retain collected proceeds for a period of ninety six 
hours, during which apparently the buyer may decide whether or not to 
attach, does not tend to facilitate commerce. See Alexander County Nat. 
Bank v. Conner, 110 Miss. 653, 70 So. 827 (1916), a case where the col- 
lecting bank became insolvent while holding the proceeds, in which it was 
held the owner was not entitled to a preferred claim. 
72 Supra note 56. 
7383 Kan. 504, 112 Pac. 114 (1910). 
4 83 Okla. 7, 200 Pac. 158 (1921). 
75127 Va. 47, 102 S. E. 649 (1920). But as to the Alabama law on the 
point compare Alexander v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., infra note 
86. 
76 St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 128 N. Y. 26, 27 N. E. 1079 
(1891). The New York court here refused to follow a holding of the Ten- 
nessee courts adopting the Massachusetts collection rule notwithstanding 
the item was left for collection with the defendant bank in Tennessee. 
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the differing situations and issues brought up for decision. It 
is also evident that little if any consideration is being given, at 
least in the reported decisions, to the part such deposits play 
in the general financial scheme of things. The chief objective 
appears to be to write in successive cases, although involving 
wholly different issues, a self-consistent statement of the law, 
following the supposed implications of the descriptive terms 
"agency" or "purchase," depending upon which may have been 
first used in the state. While consistent statement has its value, 
it should be subservient to desirability of result. And it is at 
least fairly clear that the present course of decision is no more 
likely to result in uniformity of opinion among courts generally 
than it will in entirely satisfactory results in all of the various 
situations that come before any one court. 
It is necessary in order to appreciate the difficulties of the 
problem before the courts to consider to some extent certain 
developments in banking. There have been a great many changes 
during the last seventy-five years. If one looks to the cases de- 
cided before the Civil War there is found almost no discussion 
of the problem; items were apparently received as collections.7 
In fact, the practice of giving immediate credit with privilege 
of drawing did not arise except as banking conditions became 
fairly well stabilized.78 Then under the stress of competition, 
aided by the fact that in many cases such items when sent to city 
correspondents could be counted at once as reserves, the practice 
became general, both between city bank and country bank and 
between depositors and banks. Of course, as the depositor was 
given credit at face value, it became important for the bank 
of deposit to route items so that they could be collected as cheap- 
ly as possible, even though in a roundabout way. Thus items 
were sent to banks with which mutual account arrangements 
were established, each giving the other immediate credit with 
privilege of drawing, and handling the collection without 
charge.79 Much of this practice is gone. It is no longer custom- 
ary for banks to maintain mutual collection accounts to any ex- 
tent; collection items in the Federal Reserve System may not be 
77 Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. 215 (N. Y. 1839); East-Haddam 
Bank v. Scovil, 12 Conn. 303 (1837); Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 
Pick. 330 (Mass. 1839). The first of these established the New York 
collection rule and the next two the Massachusetts rule. In none was there 
any consideration of the idea of purchase. 
78 It was not until sometime after the inauguration of the National Bank 
system in 1864 that the practice became at all general. The Metropolitan 
Bank case, supra note 19, decided in 1882 was one of the first to consider 
what, if any, difference should follow from the fact that the parties, bank 
and depositor, were apparently treating deposits of checks, much as, they 
would cash. 
79 WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 481, 482. 
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counted as reserves until collected ;80 and, although the practice 
of giving immediate credit to depositors still obtains, it has 
been hedged about in many ways. 
One of the abuses of the system, "kiting," 81 no doubt contrib- 
uted to the present change in practice. By opening a local ac- 
count and one at a distant point a depositor, who alternately 
deposited in one bank a check drawn on the other, could always 
have at his disposal without interest and without having had any 
actual funds, the amount of his checks. This was obviously un- 
profitable. But, without kiting, something of the same sort 
occurs whenever drawing against uncollected items is allowed. 
And from the bank's standpoint it is recognized that the uses to 
which the paper can now be put are in many cases no longer ade- 
quate compensation. As a consequence, some banks stipulate 
that drawing in such cases will not be allowed.82 Others charge 
80 Credit for purposes of reserves is given on the basis of a time schedule 
arranged according to the average time necessary to collect items drawn 
on the particular point. The unusual case, that of dishonored items, is 
subsequently adjusted by being charged back to the member bank's 
account with the Federal Reserve bank in question. KNIFFIN, op. cit. supra 
note 5, at 190. 
81 The practice of "kiting" is described in some detail in People's State 
Bank v. Miller, 185 Mich. 565, 152 N. W. 257 (1915). Here a firm of 
brokers, which had been in the practice of maintaining fictitious balances 
with the plaintiff bank, deposited a check drawn by the defendant and 
were given immediate credit. The firm failed having less real balance in 
its favor than the defendant's check amounted to. It was held that the 
plaintiff could not be a purchaser by reason of the fact that it used the 
usual form of waiver reading "This bank, in receiving check or draft on 
deposit or for collection, acts only as your agent, and, beyond carefulness 
in selecting agents at other points and in forwarding to them, assumes no 
responsibility." The court said: "Under the contract here entered into 
between the bank and the brokerage concern, it is clear that the bank be- 
came the latter's agent for collection of the checks, and could not, it is 
needless to suggest, be the owner of the paper at the same time." 
To the claim that at least the bank's lien interest should be protected the 
court said that this was not enforceable as the bank, having had some 
knowledge of the brokerage firms kiting operations, could not be said to 
have acted bona fide. In this connection it should also be noted that there 
has long been authority in the Federal courts to the effect that a bank may 
not retain collections by virtue of its banker's lien, at least as against the 
real owner, unless it has given new value. Bank of Metropolis v. New Eng- 
land Bank, 6 How. 212 (U. S. 1848); Commercial National Bank v. Stock- 
yards Loan Co., 16 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). 
82 The case of In re Jarmulowsky, 249 Fed. 319 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), in- 
volved a claim for preference, the court granting it on the ground that the 
clause, "Deposits of currency or coin may be drawn against after deposit, 
but deposits of checks shall not be drawn against until collected," showed 
that an agency relation existed. To the same effect is In re Farrow's Bank, 
Ltd. [1923] 1 Ch. 41, the clause being the same although phrased some- 
what more circumspectly, "Customers are respectfully informed that the 
bank reserves to itself the right, at its discretion, to defer payment of 
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interest to the extent that drawings may have been allowed 
against so-called "float," uncollected items.83 
This development, taken with the agency collection clauses sti- 
pulating for non-responsibility for acts of correspondents, and 
the latest model charge back provisions, would appear to deprive 
the immediate credit circumstance of almost all of its substance. 
Are we then to look forward to the probability that in future 
litigation the tendency will be more and more to adopt the 
"agency" statement of the case? As indicated above, many courts 
now consider the simplest charge back custom inimical to "pur- 
chase." 84 The others when faced with the newer provisions 
allowing charge back even though the item has been paid can no 
longer say they are merely enforcing the depositor's liability as 
indorser-and some will no doubt say "agency." Again, if "right 
to draw" is of the "essence" of the purchase doctrine, it might 
be expected, as has been held, that stipulations forbidding draw- 
ing against uncollected items bring about an "agency." 85 And 
many courts have read the clause stipulating for non-responsi- 
bility for collecting agents as necessarily bringing about "agen- 
cy" 86 and negativing the "purchase" doctrine. It is evident that 
there is much future litigation in prospect. 
To assist in unravelling the tangle, let us hold a short confer- 
ence between the courts and the parties concerned. In the last 
analysis the courts are engaged in writing, piecemeal, as cases 
are presented, what in ultimate effect is very similar to a blanket 
agreement between the parties, so the conference should be pro- 
cheques drawn against uncleared effects which may have been credited to 
the account." The court said: "If the bank had become holder for value of 
the cheque they could do no such thing." 
83 STANDARD BANKING, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING (1924) 124-126. 
Whether interest is charged in advance as in the typical discount case or 
not until after collection would seem to be immaterial. Both would be 
consistent with the "purchase" view. 
84 Supra note 59. 
85 Supra note 82. 
86 For example, see National Bank of Commerce v. Bossemeyer, 101 
Neb. 96, 162 N. W. 503 (1917), wherein the clause read in part: "This 
bank in receiving out of town checks and other collections acts only as 
your agent .. ." See also In re Assignment of State Bank, supra 
note 31. 
With more carefully drawn provisions the result should be different. 
But in Alexander v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., 206 Ala. 50, 89 
So. 66 (1921), although the court was influenced largely by the charge 
back feature, an attachment by a creditor of the depositor was held good, 
notwithstanding the clause avoided describing the bank of deposit as agent. 
It read: "In receiving checks or other items on deposit payable elsewhere 
than in Seattle, this bank assumes no responsibility for the failure of any 
of its direct or indirect collecting agents and shall only be held liable 
when proceeds in actual funds or solvent credits shall have come into its 
possession. . . " 
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fitable. It is believed that the banker and the depositor would 
be fairly in accord on the proposition that the immediate credit 
system is, in the great majority of cases, quite satisfactory when 
it means what is usually understood by "purchase." Credit is 
given at face, there are no collection charges 87 and the respons- 
ible depositor has the privilege of immediate drawing, a credit 
matter of great importance to him. The bank, regarded as "pur- 
chaser," may rediscount the item, collect it through such chan- 
nels and in such manner as it sees fit, and in further dealings 
with the depositor be protected as having already become a hold- 
er of an actual security. In the normal case the item is paid 
and the transaction liquidated-a much simpler procedure than 
loaning against collateral-but one based on the fact that a very 
high percentage of such items are duly paid. Objectively, the 
parties no doubt would also agree that the credit to the deposi- 
tor's account, made in the books of the bank or in the depositor's 
passbook, should be given almost conclusive significance.88 
If the courts proceed from this norm, may they square with 
it the stipulations used by some banks refusing drawings against 
uncollected items, or the practice of others in charging interest 
against such drawings? This, to the banker, raises the loan side 
of the transaction. As a rule a depositor maintains a real bal- 
ance-not one made up of uncollected items. If the latter is the 
case, the bank must either close the account,89 shift the loss by 
increasing interest rates or, more equitably, require the unprof- 
itable customer to pay for the accommodation extended. The 
interest practice has caused little difficulty, it being readily rec- 
oncilable with notions of "purchase."90 The clauses forbid- 
ding drawing are but another way of accomplishing the same 
purpose. They are of value to the bank only in the unusual 
87 It has been estimated in an investigation for the Massachusetts State 
Legislature that the cost of collecting checks, exclusive of overhead ex- 
penses, is 1.5 cents for each check handled as a deposit and 23.7 cents for 
items handled as collections. PATON, DIGEST (1926) ? 1776. 
88 The court in the case of In re Farrow's Bank, Ltd., supra note 82, 
intimated that should the bank have received the item for "collection" it 
could not on its own motion become a "purchaser" by merely entering it 
in its customer's account. In the great majority of cases, though, it may be 
assumed, there being nothing expressly to the contrary, that a deposited 
item may be so credited. The point is not discussed in the American cases. 
In event, however, that the entry in the depositor's pass book is of paper 
as, for example, "Check on First Nat. Bk. $1000," it has been held that 
an "agency" rather than a "purchase" is established. Bailie v. Augusta 
Savings Bank, 95 Ga. 277, 21 S. E. 717 (1895). 
89 See Jaselli v. Riggs National Bank, 36 App. D. C. 159 (1911). 
90 It is interesting to note that the practice of many banks in making a 
small fixed charge should the depositor fail to maintain an average balance 
of a specified amount has never been called in question in these cases. The 
interest charge serves a somewhat similar purpose. 
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case, the unprofitable account, for as a matter of practice, in 
the case of ordinary account banks make no objection whatever 
to an occasional drawing against uncollected items. Certainly a 
clause having such limited application need not be construed as 
coloring all deposits with the "agency" brush.91 
The issue which would cause the parties most difficulty, as it 
has the courts, would concern another relatively unusual situa- 
tion, the case of losses occurring in collection. Essentially, the 
matter is one for bargaining between the parties and one which 
the courts can do little about, at least so long as they recognize 
so-called freedom of contract and enforce the "without responsi- 
bility" and "subject to final payment" bank stipulations. As a 
matter of fact, though, the courts themselves in the absence of 
either statute or stipulation have been in many cases inclined 
to relieve the banks of this risk.92 
It would seem, then, that the principal problem before the 
courts is merely one of so writing their opinions as to record 
the result. Obviously, to use the word "purchase," at least as 
usually understood, to describe the entire situation is inaccurate, 
for in the usual case so described the buyer would bear all sub- 
sequent risks,93 and of course might not charge back or reverse 
the transaction. But to attempt to sum up the contract in the 
one word "agency" is to be much more inaccurate, and allow an 
incidental matter, one of importance only in the unusual case, to 
outweigh all other elements of the transaction. In sales law 
there has been no insurmountable difficulty in the way of treat- 
ing a buyer as "owner" and yet allowing a stipulation that the 
seller should bear the risk of loss in transit.94 Of course, the 
bank's stipulations for the most part are designed for much the 
same purpose.95 There was no other way open to them. 
91 The court by Judge Hough, in the case of In re Jarmulowsky, supra 
note 82, refused to consider this argument, however. It no doubt would 
have refused utterly to consider the argument that even in the case of the 
unprofitable account, where the clause was designed to apply, the stipula- 
tion would not be necessarily inconsistent with the "purchase" view, the 
case being one of purchase on a deferred payment basis. 
92 See the cases cited supra notes 39, 40 and 41, in which the courts 
adopted the Massachusetts collection rule to deprive the depositor of a suit 
against his bank, which he would otherwise have had on the purchase 
theory. Of course this contemplated that suit might be brought against 
the correspondent at fault. And this was so in some cases although the 
correspondent had failed. 
93 Uniform Sales Act, ? 22. 
94 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) ? 302. This point is suggested in 
Comment (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 73, 75 n. 13. 
95 This is clearly so in the case of the "subject to final payment" clause 
and in the case of many others which merely stipulate for non-responsibility 
for losses in transit with privilege of charge back (for example see supra 
note 47) but it must be noted that the "as agent" phrase goes beyond the 
point. It seems more than probable that this latter terminology, originally 
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It would be preferable to disregard the terms "purchase" and 
"agency" altogether and recognize that a broader formula is 
needed to serve as a rule of decision.96 In such case there 
should be no difficulty in allowing a depositor to sue sub-agents 
for their negligence, contrary to the Douglas case,97 and yet, for 
example, in the garnishment cases to refuse to allow attachment 
by the depositor's creditors.98 While this may seem like attempt- 
ing to blow both hot and cold at the same time, it is only so on 
the assumption that either "purchase" or "agency" as usually 
understood must serve as a starting point. To make such an as- 
sumption is to allow words to dictate decisions. However, it may 
be predicted that courts will be slow to abandon the supposition 
that their decisions must be restricted to a choice between either 
"agency" or "purchase." 99 
used merely to contract out of the New York collection rule as to actual 
collections, was simply continued as to deposits primarily to avoid collec- 
tion risks and not in order to negative the "purchase" rule. 
96 The often quoted rule that the relation between bank and depositor 
is that of debtor and creditor, for example, while useful as a rule of de- 
cision in many cases is of course not a complete statement of the case. To 
illustrate, in Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England 
[1924] 1 K. B. 461, the bank though spoken of as a "debtor" was held to 
be under a duty to treat its depositor's account as confidential. See Com- 
ment (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 859. 
97 It should be noted in this connection, however, that the terms on which 
a correspondent bank undertakes to handle the paper should be those it 
arranges with the depositor's bank, and it has usually been so held. See 
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 214 N. W. 918 (Minn. 
1927). This means that if the correspondent stipulates that it may for- 
ward items directly to the drawee or may accept a bank draft in payment, 
the depositor would have no cause of action on that account. 
98 This result was reached in American Trust & Savings Bank v. Austin, 
25 Misc. 454, 55 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1898), aff'd 47 App. Div. 635, 62 N. Y. 
Supp. 1131 (1900), a garnishment case in which Judge Hiscock said: "If 
plaintiff discounted and thereby became the absolute owner of a draft for 
a customer, and the draft for any reason was not paid, it would naturally 
expect to charge it back to the customer's account or compel him in some 
way to make it good. In the case of a draft so discounted and payable in 
a distant city, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to utilize a line of 
collecting agents, and any one of them through failure or insolvency might 
defeat the collection of the draft and place plaintiff where it might desire 
to charge the same back against its customer. And as I look at it this rule 
(that the bank in receiving checks or drafts on deposit or for collection 
acted only as agent and beyond carefulness in selecting agents assumed 
no responsibility) was intended to cover that part of its transactions with 
its customers, and as to those acts to make the customer responsible and 
relieve the bank from liability except within the limits named by the rule." 
Accordingly, the bank was regarded as a purchaser and allowed to defeat 
the attachment. This was cited with approval in National Bank of Ash- 
tabula v. Bradley, 264 Fed. 700 (W. D. N. Y. 1920). 
99 In a very comprehensive review of the cases in this field in (1912) 11 
MICH. L. REv. 122, under the title Bank Deposits and Collections, the 
writer Ralph J. Baker, concludes with the observation that the two rela- 
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It is not as though the courts adopting the "agency" view are 
impelled to take that course to protect the depositor, who admit- 
tedly is in a weak bargaining position, for it does not appear to 
work out that way. For example, in the situation presented by 
the Taft case, the "agency" view relieves the bank, not the de- 
positor, if the Massachusetts collection rule obtains, and if the 
New York rule, the bank's stipulations accomplish the same end. 
In the garnishment cases the "agency" rule clearly operates to 
the disadvantage of both bank and depositor. And today, in 
the cases typified by the Metropolitan Bank decision, where the 
bank of deposit becomes insolvent after having forwarded the 
item to a correspondent to which it was indebted, the correspon- 
dent would prevail as holder in due course, regardless of whether 
the bank of deposit was "agent" or "purchaser." 100 
Only in the situations typified by the Douglas and Rochling 
cases would the agency rule favor the depositor. In the first 
of these his gain may be largely one of simplified procedure, for 
at least the depositor, as assignee of the purchasing bank of de- 
tions, debtor and creditor or principal and agent, are mutually exclusive 
and that it has been the failure to observe this which has caused the con- 
fusion in the cases. 
100 The issue is presented most often in cases where the bank of deposit 
uses an "agency" clause and then forwards the item to a correspondent 
which subsequently brings suit on the item, for example against the de- 
positor. Here if the correspondent bank gave immediate credit to the for- 
warding bank and allowed withdrawals, there has been no difficulty in sus- 
taining the correspondent bank's position as one of purchaser for value. 
Blacher v. National Bank of Baltimore, 151 Md. 514, 135 Atl. 383 (1926); 
National Bank of Commerce v. Bossemeyer, supra note 86; United States 
National Bank v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, 179 Fed. 718 (D. Or. 
1910). 
But where the bank bringing suit on the item had itself used such a 
stipulation, there has been more difficulty, although, if there had been 
drawings, recovery is usually allowed on some basis. Bank of California, 
National Assoc. v. Young, 260 Pac. 227 (Or. 1927). In the closely con- 
tested case of Old National Bank of Spokane v. Gibson, 105 Wash. 578, 179 
Pac. 117 (1919), the bank of deposit as plaintiff sued the drawer, the check 
having been deposited by the payee who had been allowed to check out 
the amount. The drawer relied upon the clause, "Items other than cash 
are received on deposit with the express understanding that they are taken 
for collection only" to show "agency" and thus to defeat the bank's cause 
of action. The majority held that the plaintiff was a holder for value 
and that in the particular case it was unnecessary to distinguish between 
lien and purchase. The four dissenting judges took the view that if the 
bank was to be regarded as having taken the paper as an agent it could 
not subsequently convert its position into that of a holder for value by 
allowing "gratuitous" drawings. In Jefferson Bank v. Merchants' Refrig- 
erating Co., 236 Mo. 407, 139 S. W. 545 (1911), the court was faced with 
the same situation and said: "we are warranted in holding that the in- 
dorsement printed on the cover of the deposit book of the Produce Company, 
to the effect that plaintiff only received out of town checks subject to col- 
lection, had been waived by plaintiff bank-a right it unquestionably had." 
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posit, has some possibility of recovering against sub-agent cor- 
respondent banks for their negligence. In the second, involving 
the contingency which the parties probably concerned themselves 
least about, if the bank is regarded as holding the deposited item 
as "agent" the depositor may be given a preferred claim.101 It 
is believed that this result, however well established, is essential- 
ly unfair to the other depositors, the principal creditors of the 
failed bank, in that it is purely fortuitous. Other depositors 
may perhaps have deposited an equal amount on the day preced- 
ing the failure, but in cash. Both would have received immediate 
credit with the same privilege of drawing. Of course, if the 
depositor of the item had indorsed it restrictively with the under- 
standing that it should be handled on a collection basis, no privi- 
lege of drawing being extended, much might be said for allowing 
a preferred claim.102 But otherwise the situation would be one 
peculiarly within the province of the courts to adjust, charged 
as they are with taking all elements of the problem into account. 
On such analysis the "purchase" result reached by Justice Stone 
in the Rochling case is much to be preferred. 
The same difference of opinion exists, however, in the insolven- 
cy cases as where other issues are presented. The older view, 
proceeding upon the theory that the term "deposit" signifies a 
species of bailment, thus allowing of reclamation, has largely dis- 
appeared.103 Those courts regarding "charge back" as inconsis- 
tent with purchase, however, as might be expected, give pre- 
ferred claims, although obviously the situation would not have 
developed to the point where the charge back provision could 
be called into play.104 The same is true of the provision by which 
the bank reserves the privilege of withholding payment of checks 
drawn against the deposit until the proceeds have been received.105 
101 The point is well established. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. 
v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566, 10 Sup. Ct. 390 (1890). This case appears to 
be out of harmony with the later supreme court cases in finding an agency 
under the circumstances before it, but it would be sustained on its further 
ruling that as the bank was hopelessly insolvent to the knowledge of its 
officers at the time of the deposit, a preferred claim should be allowed. 
Craigie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131, 1 N. E. 537 (1885). 
102 National Butchers & Drovers Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384, 22 N. E. 
1031 (1889) (preferred claim allowed in case of "For collection" indorse- 
ment). 
103 Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. 675 (C. C. N. J. 1883). Cited with 
approval SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 24, at 67. This is representative of a 
number of early cases allowing preferred claims in circumstances which 
it is believed the supreme court would today unhesitatingly regard as re- 
quiring the opposite result. 
104 For example see Armour Packing Co. v. Davis, 118 N. C. 548, 24 
S. E. 365 (1896); Miller v. Norton & Smith, 114 Va. 609, 77 S. E. 452 
(1913); Alleman v. Sayre, 79 W. Va. 763, 91 S. E. 805 (1917). 
105 In re Jarmulowsky, supra note 82. 
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And most courts construe the "as agent for collection" clauses 
as necessarily bringing about the same result.'06 This seems 
like undue emphasis of incidental matters to produce an unfor- 
tunate result. 
While it may perhaps be demonstrated, on paper, that the 
courts and parties could reconcile their positions, and that to the 
advantage of all concerned, still very little progress is being 
made to that end. Some endeavor has been made from the 
standpoint of the banks to bring about uniform stipulations.107 
These are designed primarily for bank protection. And, even if 
widely adopted, it is evident that there is no assurance whatever 
that the courts will interpret them in any uniform way or with 
much regard to the larger questions of policy mentioned above 
in the first few paragraphs. 
One alternative would be to wholly abandon the "purchase" 
idea, and take items exclusively on an "agency" basis, no credit 
being given to the checking account. If so, the depositor should 
perhaps be advised, for his better protection, to indorse restric- 
tively-thus avoiding losses, for example, in the situation pre- 
sented in the Metropolitan case among others. This course would 
compare, although perhaps remotely, with recommending that 
depositors withdraw their balances and keep their money pri- 
vately. Certainly it would permit of only a limited use of 
what otherwise serves as a valuable security. Drawings would 
be allowed, if at all, on an overdraft basis, a custom prevail- 
ing in foreign banking but not usual here, or the depositor 
would be required to execute notes as required, possibly pledg- 
ing his collections as security. This would be a needlessly expen- 
106 In re Assignment of State Bank, supra note 31. 
107 In 1925 the General Counsel for the American Bankers Association 
recommended the following form for adoption by all banks: "In receiving 
items for deposit or collection, this bank acts only as depositor's collecting 
agent and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise of due care. All 
items are credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent credits. This 
bank will not be liable for default or negligence of its duly selected corre- 
spondents nor for losses in transit, and each correspondent so selected shall 
not be liable except for its own negligence. This bank or its correspond- 
ents may send items directly or indirectly, to any bank including the payor, 
and accept its draft or credit as conditional payment in lieu of cash; it 
may charge back any item at any time before final payment, whether re- 
turned or not; also any item drawn on this bank not good at close of busi- 
ness on day deposited." PATON, DIGEST (1926), Opinions 1446, 1446 a. 
It is to be noted that most courts would read the words "as depositor's 
collecting agent" to bring about an agency, a result believed to be unsatis- 
factory in many ways. This clause is not necessary nor is it believed to 
be advisable in the many states having the Massachusetts collection rule. 
Of course, in any case many courts would seize upon the charge back pro- 
vision as indicative of "agency." For the banks own protection it is thus 
probably not desirable to use the clause in the case of discounted items 
whose proceeds may be garnished. 
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sive system; not to be compared with the properly safeguarded 
immediate credit system in flexibility and responsiveness to busi- 
ness requirements. 
Possibly a sounder suggestion would be for banks to reverse 
their traditional practice and hereafter assume all risks of col- 
lection-much as the New York collection rule would have it. 
There would thus be no reversal of the transaction except, of 
course, in the case of dishonored items which had been properly 
handled. There has been no possibility of adopting such a course 
by any bank individually, for the failure of a single correspond- 
ent collecting bank might bring about losses sufficient to wreck 
the forwarding bank. However, it would be possible to insure 
this risk, the premium being charged to the depositor each month 
on the basis of the amount of such paper put through during the 
period.108 In view of the present position of depositors this 
would seem to be quite worth while protection to them. From 
the standpoint of society, in addition to the gain to result from 
the elimination of much of the needless litigation on the "pur- 
chase"-"agency" controversy, a result which would probably 
follow from omitting the charge back, and non-responsibility 
clauses, an economical system of adjusting losses between banks 
informally could be worked out without requirement of litiga- 
tion. Actually bank collection losses should be settled between 
banks,'09 a result in large part accomplished indirectly in coun- 
tries having nation-wide branch banking. 
This would at once, however, raise many questions fully as 
unsettled, or if settled as unsatisfactorily settled, as those dis- 
cussed above-the matter of what constitutes due diligence in 
handling collections, in what medium collections may be made, 
and a number of others. The practice of Federal Reserve Banks 
in forwarding items directly to the drawee or paying bank would 
need to be sanctioned. The status of items indorsed for "collection 
and remittance" in event of the insolvency of a collecting bank 
would have to be determined.110 There is no good reason, how- 
108 It is not uncommon now for a seller to insure his factory, his stock 
in trade, certain risks in transit (although the risk is usually upon the 
buyer), the account receivable and even the paper the buyer's obligation 
is written on against forgery-only the bank collection losses are uncovered. 
109 In the case of carriers, a similar result has been accomplished by 
the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, providing that 
the initial carrier should be responsible to the shipper although the loss 
occurred on a connecting line. See Basila v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 
F. (2d) 569 (S. D. Fla. 1928), holding, however, that this does not apply 
to the transmission of money by telegraph. 
'lo It would seem to be advisable to accord the owner of such paper a 
preferred claim against the collecting bank holding the proceeds at the 
time of its solvency. And the more or less artificial rule of the Federal 
courts as to augmentation of assets could well be abandoned. See Com- 
ment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 682. It is interesting to note that 
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ever, for not actually doing something to agree upon these 
points.lll 
It may be that the most promising way, whatever decision is 
to be reached on these points, will be to draft uniform legisla- 
tion."2 In this way there is greater assurance that the interests 
of all parties, depositors, creditors, buyers as well as banks, will 
be given due consideration, and, further, that the significance of 
bank deposits in their relation to the financial system will be 
taken into account. The legislation respecting negotiable instru- 
ments, although far from perfect, has, it is believed, fully justi- 
fied itself. It surely is of as much importance that the law con- 
cerning the deposit and collection of such paper should be satis- 
factorily stated and made uniform. 
North Carolina has recently adopted legislation substantially to this effect. 
See discussion in (1928) 6 N. C. L. REV. 175. 
111 It has for many years been recommended that a uniform bank col- 
lection law be adopted. See PATON, op. cit. supra note 107, Opinion 1450, 
dated 1911. 
112 Such legislation as applied to National Banks would present many 
constitutional law problems. See Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 
275, 16 Sup. Ct. 502 (1895), in which a New York statute giving savings 
banks as depositors in national banks a preferred claim was held invalid. 
This problem is being raised in the absence of statute. See Central Na- 
tional Bank v. First National Bank, 216 N. W. 302 (Neb. 1927). In many 
situations, however, there would be no conflict and as to those requiring 
such action Federal legislation could no doubt be had. 
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